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BANKS AND BANKING--SUBROGATION OF STOCKHOLDERS TO RIGHTS OF
DEPOSITORS.-ARTHUR ET AL. V. PEOPLE'S BANK OF UNION ET AL., 83 S. E.
(S. C) 778.-Under an act imposing upon stockholders of a bank an
individual liability to depositors, held, that stockholders who have dis-
charged this liability to the depositors, are subrogated to the rights of
the latter in the distribution of newly discovered assets of the insolvent
bank, and may participate on an equal footing with creditors. Watts, J.,
dissenting.
By the doctrine of subrogation persons who have discharged a debt
for which they were secondarily liable are admitted to the rights of
the creditors against the primary debtors. Lackawanna Trust & Safe
Deposit Co. v. Gomeringer, 236 Pa. 179. No contract of suretyship
is necessary; it is sufficient if one is under compulsion of law, or
bound by considerations of self-interest, to pay a debt which is, in whole
or in part, not his own. Dill v. Vondelt, 94 Ind. 590; Wilson v. Wilson,
6 Idaho 597; Opp v. Ward, 125 Ind. 241. Thus, in the case of two joint
obligors, both principals, each stands in the relation of surety to the other,
to the extent of his legal liability over and above his own equitable share
of the indebtedness. Wilks v. Vaughan, 73 Ark. 174; Sands, Adm'r. v.
Durham, 99 Va. 263. Under provisions similar to those under construction
in the principal case, the relation of stockholder to corporation has been
held to be one of surety or guarantor to principal. In re Humboldt
Safe-Deposit & Trust Co., 3 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 621. However, the elementary
rule of law postponing stockholders as such to the general creditors in
the distribution of assets is a recognition of some degree of proprietary
identity between corporation and stockholder. Reagan v. Chicago First
Nat. Bank, 157 Ind. 623. This consideration has led a California court
to treat the individual liability of stockholders imposed by law as primary,
and therefore to deny the right of subrogation. Sacramento Bank v.
Pacific Bank, 124 Cal. 147. The same result was reached in New York,
under a statute since repealed. Hollister v. Hollister Bank, 41 N. Y. 245.
An analogy drawn from the relation of partner toward the firm debts
lends some support to this view. Bailey v. Brom field, 8 Harris (Pa.) 4r.
Authorities directly in point are meagre, but a few unqualifiedly sustain
the principal case. Appeal of Craig, 92 Pa. St. 396; see City Bank of
Macon v. Crossland, 65 Ga. 734. This conclusion can hardly be escaped,
if we grant, what seems to be the more prevalent and reasonabl view, that
the statute in question is designed to create a compulsory suretyship in
the interest of the depositors, and not to enforce a primary duty resting
upon the stockholders by virtue of their substantial identity of interest with
the corporation.
BILLS AND NOTES-TRANSFERS-ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION.-PENNY SAVINGS
BANK v. FITZGERALD, 149 N. W. (IowA) 497.-Held, that a negotiable note
is not void in the hands of a bona fide holder because founded on an
illegal or immoral consideration, unless made so by positive statute.
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Where a statute provides that all negotiable instruments given in con-
sideration of patented machines or patent rights shall be absolutely void
unless they show on their face that they were executed for such con-
sideration, they are void even in the hands of a purchaser in due course.
Wyatt v. Wallace, 67 Ark. 575. Where a note is void because of usury,
a purchaser for value cannot enforce it. Cousins v. Siegman, 142 N. Y.
Supp. 348. The language of the statute decisive of this last case is "the
court shall declare the same (usurious note) void and enjoin prosecution
thereon." When a statute merely makes the consideration of a note
illegal, the note is valid in the hands of a holder in due course. Bluthenthal
& Bickart v. City of Columbia, 57 So. (Ala.) 814. Though a seller of
a patent right who fails to express the consideration on the face of a note
is guilty of a misdemeanor, the note is not rendered void in the hands of
a bona fide holder. Smith v. Wood, in Ga. 221. The illegality of the
consideration of a negotiable note does not vitiate it in the hands of a
bona fide purchaser whether the illegal act is inalm in se or malum
prohivitum, unless the statute making the act illegal expressly or by neces-
sary implication makes the instrument absolutely void. Gray v. Boyle, 55
Wash. 578.
So that in an action by a holder in due course, it is not a legal defense
that the note was executed on Sunday or on account of a stock gambling
transaction. Myers v. Kessler, 142 F. 73o. There is no question but that
where the statute in direct terms declares that a note given in violation
thereof shall be void, the note is void no matter into whose hands it may
pass. New v. Walker, ioS Ind. 365. The holding of the principal case
is sound and represents the law under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
DESCENT AND DisuTnIUON-CAusING OR PROCURING DEATH OF INTES-
TATE.-WALL V. PFANSCHMIDT ET AL., io6 N. E. (ILL.) 795.-Under a
statute which provided how property should descend on the death of an
intestate it was held that a son who murdered his father, mother and
brother in order to obtain their property could take an absolute title on
the ground that the statute made no exception in such a case.
At common law there was a rule to the effect that "No one shall be
permitted to acquire property by his own crime." This has been held to
prevent the taking by a murderer of the property of his victim at common
law. Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393; Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve & Insur-
ance Co., L. R. I Q. B. 147; Wharton on Homicide (3d Ed.), Sec. 665.
In the above cases the courts reasoned on grounds of public policy; it
was against the public interest to furnish an incentive to crime. However,
where a state has passed a stdtute defining how property shall descend the
weight of authority is that the courts cannot read in any exceptions what-
ever; the murderer must take by descent like any one else. The argument
is that the statute makes nearness of relationship and not character or
conduct the test and that when the legislature has spoken it settles the
whole matter and the courts must conform no matter how unjust a result
may follow. Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio 357; Ayres v. Trego City, 37 Kans.
240; McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kans. 533; In re Carpenter's Estate, 17o Pa.
24
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203; Gollnik's Estate, 112 Minn. 349. In Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb.
61, the court considered the common law maxim and denied the murderer's
right to take under the statute, but on a re-hearing, 41 Neb. 631, this
decision was reversed on the ground that the court could not read an excep-
tion into an unambiguous statute. The only 'case which squarely conflicts
with the weight of authority seems to be Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo.
621. There it was held that a husband who had murdered his wife could
not take under the statute because the statute must be construed in the
light of the common law, which never allowed property to descend in
such a case. This case admits that the weight of authority is otherwise.
The very manifest danger that such a state of the law may furnish an
incentive to crime has been recognized in several states, notably Tennessee,
California and Iowa, and the statutes have been amended to prevent any-
one taking by descent by reason of his own felonious act.
DOWER-INcHoATE RIGHT-INJUNCTION OF WASTE BY ALIENEE.-RuMsEY
V. SULLIVAN ET AL., 150 N. Y. Supp. 287.-Held, that a wife who has not
joined in the conveyance of land by her husband, is not entitled to an
injunction against waste by the alienee, even though the substantial value
of her interest is threatened with destruction. Kruse, P. J., dissenting.
The inchoate right of dower, while always regarded with especial solici-
tude by the law, is not an estate in land within the protection of the
constitutional guaranties of property rights. Barbour v. Barbour, 46
Me. 9. Nor is it entitled to compensation upon extinction through the
exercise of the right of eminent domain. Moore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 11o.
It is, however, a substantial interest, indefeasible by the sole alienation
of the husband. House v. Jackson, 5o N. Y. 161. Nor can it be defeated
by execution in behalf of his creditors. Jewett 'v. Feldheiser, 68 Oh. St.
523. It has a present money value capable of estimation by well defined
rules. Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 386. So substantial is the
interest, that a wife who has joined in a mortgage of the estate has been
regarded as a surety, entitled accordingly, by subrogation, to a share of
the surplus proceeds upon a foreclosure sale. Matthews v. Duryee, 4
Keyes (N. Y.) 525. Contra, Newhall v. Savings Bank, IOI Mass. 428.
Cf. Gore v. Townsend, 105 N. C. 228 (entitled to exoneration). The
inchoate dower right is protected scrupulously against fraud which
threatens it in toto. Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298; Burns v. Lynde,
6 Allen (Mass.) 305. Even dower consummate, however, has been held
not entitled to protection from depreciation through waste. Powell v.
Mfg. Co., 3 Mason (U. S.) 365; Hales v. James, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
26o; McClanahan v. Porter, IO Mo. 746. Furthermore an alienee is, in
America, specially favored to the extent of an allowance for his improve-
ments prior to the assignment of dower. Thompson v. Morrow, 5 S. &
R. (Pa.) 290; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218. This has been carried so far
that a dower claimant was denied the benefit of an improvement which
was merely a reparation of previous waste. Wisteoll v. Campbell, II R. I.
378. The principal case, though one of unusual hardship, accords with
the above-delineated policy of the law, which protects the dower right
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only as a totality, while affording no protection against contingencies
affecting merely the quantum of the interest. A dower claimant, as a
mere volunteer, has of course less equity than a lien-holder, to whom in
other respects her position is most comparable.
EVIDENCE-EXPERT WITNESSES-READING OF SCIENTIFIC Booxs-ULLRIcH
v. CaiCAo CITY Ry. Co., io6 N. E. (ILL.) 828. Where a physician, testi-
fying that hysteria can never result from a physical injury but is congeni-
tal, based his opinion on his own observation and experiences, without
relying on any text-books or writers on the subject, a cross-examination
consisting of references to medical works, so as to convey to the jury the
impression that the physician was testifying contrary to medical authority
on the subject of hysteria, was improper.
In general a broad range of inquiry is permitted in cross-examining
experts. Trull v. Modern Woodmen, 12 Ind. 318. Early, however, on
the ground of hearsay, it was held improper to allow quotations from
medical works as evidence. Collier v. Simpson. 5 C. & P. 73. The pre-
ponderance of cases hold this view. Gallagher v. Ry. Co., 67 Cal. 16;
Galveston Ry. v. Hanway, g4 Tex. 76; Mitchell v. Leech, 48 S. E. (S. C.)
290; Hall v. Murdock, 114 Mich. 233; Butler v. South Carolina Co.,
etc., 13o N. C. 15. In Wharton on Evidence, sec. 665, the reasons for the
rule are stated with approval. The contrary rule has been adopted in
Iowa and Alabama. Bowman v. Woods, ig Greene (Iowa) 445; Stouden-
meier v. Williams, 29 Ala. 558; Bales v. State, 63 Atl. (Ala.) 38. In Sale
v. Eichberg, lo5 Tenn. 333, it was held proper to read from a medical
work to test a witness's capacity. In Clukey v. Seattle Electric Co.,
27 Wash. 70, the exclusionary rule was narrowed by the holding that when,
on cross examination, the question was asked whether medical authorities
did not lay down certain rules, the reading of such rules from an author's
work was proper. Conn. MAt. Co. v. Ellis, 89 Ill. S16, held that para-
graphs from books might be read and the witness asked if he agreed.
Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225, and City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614,
held that the same may be done to test the learning of the witness. Cf.
Western Assuraice Co. v. Mohlinan, 83 Fed. 811. A ruling contrary to
that of the principal case was adopted in State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, on
the ground that the practice had been permitted by tacit consent for many
years. The rule of the principal case is criticized in Wigmore on Evidence,
sec. i6go et seq., and Croswell's Greenleaf on Evidence, 15th ed. sec. 497,
note 4. In Rogers on Expert Testimony, sec. 174, however, it is stated
that "the rule (of Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry.) is supported by the better
reason." There is no question that the decision of the principal case
accords with the weight of authority, but it would seem, for the reasons
pointed out by Wigmore, that the opposite view is sounder on principle,
since the objections urged go rather to the weight than the competency
of the evidence.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ADvANCES TO HUSBAND--INTEEST.-RIKER V.
RIKEP, 92 Am. (N. J.) 586.-Held, a husband is not required to pay inter-
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est on advances to him by his wife in the absence of a special agreement
to that effect.
On money paid on account of another, or to the use or benefit of
another, or at the request of another, interest-is allowable from the
time payment- is made. Hodges v. Hodges, 9 R. I. 32. A husband and
wife may enter into the relation of debtor and creditor. Rowland v.
Plunme, 50 Ala. 182; Logan v. Hall, ig Iowa 491. But mere delivery
of money without other evidence of a contract raises no legal pre-
sumption that the transaction was a loan. Coburn v. Storer, 67 N. H.
86. Therefore the wife's right as.a creditor must be clearly established.
Hamill's Appeal, 88 Pa. 363; Brady v. Brady, 58 Atl. (N. J.) 931. Hence
if the husband and wife treat each other as borrower and lender and
there is nothing which would make it inequitable to require the payment
of interest, it should be allowed. Hodges v. Hodges, supra'. On principle,
a wife should be allowed interest on loans to her husband the same as on
loans to a stranger. Where a loan has been clearly shown, there is no
logical reason for requiring further evidence of a promise to pay interest
on the loan.
INFANTS-C NTRACTS-DSAFFIRMANCE.-CHAMBERS ET AL. V. CHATTA-
NOOGA UNION Ry. Co. ET AL., 17X S. W. (TENN.) 84.-Dictum: If a female
infant contracts as to realty and then, before attaining majority, marries,
she must disaffirm the contract within a reasonable time after coming of
age, if at all.
In Tennessee, married women may contract only with reference to their
mercantile or manufacturing business. Shannon's Supplement to the Code
of Tennessee, Sec. 4241. In all other respects their rights are determined
by common law. Throughout the country the lrevailing doctrine is that
if a female infant marries and then contracts, her husband being joined,
she must disaffirm within a reasonable time after both the disabilities
of coverture and infancy are gone, if at all. Sims v. Bardoner, 86 Ind. 87
(33 years after making of contract) ; Matthewson v. Davis, 2 Colo. 451;
Gaskins v. Allen, 137 N. C. 426; Sims v. Everhardt, 1o2 U. S. 300. No
infant may disaffirm a contract concerning real property until majority is
attained. Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. i8og; Tucker v. Moreland, io Pet.
58; Shipley v. Bunn, 125 Mo. 445; Shroyer v. Pittenger, 31 Ind. App. 158.
Hence the infant in the principal case could not disaffirm until after mar-
riage (which occurred before majority) because of infancy, and could
not during coverture. So sound reason would seem to point out that she
should have until a reasonable time after discoverture in which to
disaffirm. The dictum is erroneous on common law principles.
INFANTS-CoNTRACTS.-CHAMBERS V. CHATTANOOGA UNION RY. Co.,
171 S. W. (TENN.) 84.-Held, that when the court can pronounce the
contract to be to the infant's prejudice, it is void; when to his benefit,
as for necessaries, it is good; and, when the contract is of an uncertain
nature as to benefit or prejudice, it is voidable only at the election of the
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infant. The contract in the principal case was pronounced to be to the
infant's prejudice and hence void.
This classification was first set forth in the English case of Keane v.
Boycott, 2 H. BI. 51. It has been cited and approved in this country.
Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. So; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Green v.
Wilding, 59 Iowa 679. The classification has been followed in a number
of other cases. Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 1O2; Tucker v. Moreland,
1o Pet. 58; Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich. 182; Breckenridge's Heirs v.
Ormsby, 24 Ky. 236. The last-named case disapproves of the rule but
considers itself bound by precedent. The great majority of modern deci-
sions refuse to call any contract of an infant void, with the possible excep-
tion of a power of attorney, but classify them as binding, when for
necessaries, or voidable. Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70; Logan v.
Gardner, 136 Pa. 588; Semmon v. Beeman, 45 Oh. St. 5o5; Person, Adm'r.
v. Chase, 37 Vt. 648; Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 42o; Bozeman et al. v.
Browning et al., 31 Ark. 364; Morton v. Steward, 5 Ill. App. 533; Philpot
v. Sandwich Mfg. Co., 18 Neb. 54. This second classification amply pro-
tects the infant, while it relieves the courts of the arduous task of deter-
mining whether a particular contract is prejudicial or not, a distinction
which necessarily must be arbitrary and doubtful. All the modern text-
writers and authorities favor the second classification as being more just
and beneficial than the rule laid down in the principal case. Clark on Con-
tracts, 223-224; Pollock on Contracts, 53; Tiffany on Persons, 387-390.
INSANE PERSOs-CNTRAcTs-VALiDITY-BRAuER v. LAWRENCE, 150
N. Y. SuPP. 497.-Held, where a person who had been adjudicated incom-
petent to manage her affairs by a judgment of the state of her residence,
she was conclusively presumed incapable of contracting and her contract
for professional services of attorneys was void.
The general rule is that when the insanity has been judicially adjudged,
the contract of an insane person is void. Hanley v. Loan & Investment
Co., 44 W. Va. 450; Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312. This was held
so even where the adjudication was in another state. Bank v. Boone, 1O2
Ga. 2o2. The great weight of authority is that such a contract is merely
voidable if the sanity has not been judicially declared. Bunn" v. Postell,
lO7 Ga. 49o; Insurance Co. v. Sellers, 154 Ind. 370; Busk v. Fenton, 77
Ky. 49o; Morris v. Railway Co., 67 Minn. 74; Ratcliff v. Adm'r., 13
Idaho 152. Where the insanity has not been judicially declared and the
sane person does not know of it, and the contract is so far performed that
the parties cannot be put in statu quo, the contract is binding on the
insane person. Commonwealth v. Forsythe, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1O38;
Nutter v. Ins. Co., 136 N. W. (Iowa) 891. All jurisdictions allow a recov-
ery for necessaries furnished him, but this is really a quasi-contractual
xemedy. Brown v. Bill, 132 Ala. 85; Shaw v. Thompson, 33 Mass. 198;
In re Stiles, 12o N. Y. Supp. 714. The sane person is never allowed to
avoid the contract. Mead v. Stigall, 77 Ill. 679.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEFECE CONSTRUCTION -OF BUILDING-DAM-
AGEs-LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.-LEVINE V. MCCLENATHAN, 92 ATL. (PA.)
317.-Held, where a tenant's stock of merchandise was damaged from
leakage of water, due to defective construction existing when the lease
was executed, and where there was no covenant of warranty that the
building was in a tenantable condition, or provision requiring the land-
lord to repair, the landlord was not liable.
Where a landlord agrees to make repairs, which he subsequently refuses
to make, he is liable for all injuries caused by his failure to make them.
Mason v. Howes, 122 Mich. 329. A landlord who at the request of his
tenant undertakes to make repairs is liable for the negligent conduct of
the work to the same extent as if he were bound by the lease to do the
work. Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573. A landlord is liable for
injuries to property caused by his failure to repair any part of the
premises which is reserved by him for the use of all the tenants in the
building. Karp v. Barton, 164 Mo. App. 389. The landlord is not always
exempt from liability for damage due to the defective condition of the
premises existing when the lease was executed. If a landlord, with
knowledge that the premises are defective or dangerous and that such
defect is not discoverable by the tenant by the use of ordinary care, rents
such premises, concealing such knowledge, he is liable to the tenant for
injuries sustained therefrom. Holzhauer v. Sheeny, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1238.
Moreover, a landlord who permits another tenant to make alterations will
be liable for the property of a tenant destroyed or injured by negligence
in the making of these alterations. Blickley v. Lice, 148 Mich. 233.
That the landlord is not bound to repair in the absence of an agreement
on his part to do so, is well settled. Weinsteine v. Harrison, 66 Tex. 546;
Opdyke v. Prouty, 6 Hun (N. Y.) 242.
MARBIAGE-ANNULMENT-FRAUD CONCERNING HEALTH.-SoBoL v. SOBOL,
150 N. Y. Supp. 248.-Held, that it was fraud, justifying the annulment of
a marriage, for the man to conceal the fact that he was afflicted with
tuberculosis.
A court of chancery may annul a marriage because of fraud. Tefft v.
Tefft, 35 Ind. 44; Wightman v. Wightinan, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 343;
Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 46o. The general rule is that such fraud must go
to an essential element of the marriage relation. Smith v. Smith, 171
Mass. 4o4; Crane v. Crane, 62 N. J. Eq. 21; Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366.
Under this rule the fraudulent concealment of a chronic venereal disease
will be ground for annulling the marriage, because of the contagious and
16athsome nature of the disease and the danger of its transmission to the
offspring. Smith v. Smith, supra; Crane v. Crane, supra; Ryder v. Ryder,
66 Vt. 158. But misrepresentations as to the party's social standing or
as to his previous character have been held not sufficient to annul the
marriage. Weir v. Still, 31 Iowa 1O7; Beckley v. Beckley, 115 Ill. App. 27.
In the case of Lyon v. Lyon, supra, a fraudulent representation that the
party had been cured of epilepsy was held not sufficient under the above
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rule. But where a statute forbids an epileptic to marry, a fraudulent
concealment of that fact is ground for annulment. Gould v. Gould,
78 Conn. 242, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 531. The New York court has adopted
a broader rule, in that any misrepresentation of a material fact incidental
to the contract of marriage is sufficient to avoid it. Di Lorenzo v.
Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, held that where the plaintiff was induced to
marry the defendant by her false representations that he was the father
of her child, the marriage was a nullity. See also Keyes v. Keyes,
6 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 355. The contagious nature of tuberculosis, and
the fact that the offspring of a person so afflicted are born with a tendency
to become infected, would bring the principal case within the New York
rule. Under the more general rule as construed in Lyon v. Lyon, supra,
the marriage would evidently not be annulled.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PERSON-NEGLIGENCE OF
SERVANT-OPERATION OF AUTOmOBILE-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-McHARG V.
ADT, 149 N. Y. Supi. 244.-Defendant's wife, having authority to give
orders to her husband's chauffeur in the use of the car in her husband's
absence with reference to "anything reasonable," while being driven to a
club discovered an injured woman by the roadside and directed the
chauffeur to go for a doctor. This he did, finding plaintiff, who entered
the car, and, on the way back to the injured woman, there was a collision
with a wagon in which plaintiff received injuries. Held, the relation of
master and servant existed and the defendant was liable for injuries
resulting from the chauffeur's negligence. Kellogg, J., dissenling.
In general a master is only liable for the acts of his servant which are
done within the scope of the servant's employment. Goodwin v. Rowe,
135 Pac. (Ore.) 171; Fielder v. Davison, 139 Iowa 5og. "Scope of em-
ployment" has been defined as "those acts which are fairly incident to
the employment. Thus any act directed or authorized by the master is
included, but acts of the agent willfully done without the authorization of
the master are not." Goodloe v. Memphis, etc., R. R., io7 Ala. 233. But
to be within the scope of the servant's employment the act must not only
be done in the time, but pursuant to the objects of the employment. Kemp
v. Chicago, R. L and P. R. R., 138 Pac. (Kans.) 621; Ploetz v. Holt,
144 N. W. (Minn.) 745. These two cases tend to hold contra to the
principal case. On the other hand, there are many cases that directly
support the principal case. For example, where the defendant supplied
the automobile for his own and his family's use he was held liable for an
injury caused by his chauffeur's negligence although the latter was running
the machine under the directions of members of the defendant's family.
Cohen v. Borgenecht, 144 N. Y. Supp. 399. And in Davies v. Anglo-Ameri-
can Tire Co., 145 N. Y. Supp. 341, it was held that the master's liability does
not depend on his ignorance or consent to the servants acts but solely on
the question whether at the time of these acts the servant was acting
within the scope of his employment. Upon the whole the general rule
of respondeat superior would seem to be applicable to the principal case.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF MASTER TO SERVANT FOR THE
MASTER'S OWN TORTS-NON-AsSIGNABLE DUTIES.-STEELE v. GRANT, 82
S. E. (N. C.) O38.-HSeld, that in an action against an employer the negli-
gence of a fellow servant in not furnishing suitable appliances and a safe
place in which to work was no defence, that duty not being delegable.
There are several non-assignable duties which a master generally owes.
Such is the duty to employ sufficient and competent servants and agents.
Flike v. The B. & A. R. R., 53 N. Y. 549. Of the same nature is the duty
to furnish proper and safe machinery, implements, facilities and materials
for the servant. Cone v. D. L. & W. R. R., 81 N. Y. 2o6; English v.
Amidon, 72 N. H. 3Ol; Rincicotti v. O'Brien Contracting Co., 77 Conn.
617. The master may not delegate his duty to make rules reasonably
required to prevent accident. Abel v. President, etc., D. & H. C. Co.,
lO3 N. Y. 581; Daley v. American Printing Co., 152 Mass. 581. Likewise,
the master must instruct a servant, ignorant of them, concerning the
dangers and requirements of the occupation. Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Miller, lO4 Fed. 124; Toyce v. American Writing Paper Co., 184 Mass.
23o. The principal case falls within the second class referred to above.
This second class differs from the others in that, although they may be at
times impractical or inconvenient for the employer to perform, it is
generally impossible" for an employer to personally see that every imple-
ment in his plant is reasonably safe. Of course he can be made an insurer
as under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, but this is not the common
law rule, which is that the employer must merely use reasonable care to
provide reasonably safe instrumentalities. Gerrish v. The New Haven Ice
Co., 63 Conn. 16; see also cases supra. These cases, however, hold with
the principal case that delegation to a competent agent is never allowable.
It is submitted that this rule is too broad, and that the requirement of
reasonable care is satisfied when, in a case where as a practical business
matter a duty must be assigned to an employee, the employer has done his
best to select a competent one. The servant may reasonably be said to
assume any risk beyond this, and the courts of New York seem to so hold.
Madigan v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., 178 N. Y. 242; Cregan v. Marston,
126 N. Y. 568.
WILLS-LEGACIES-CONDIIONs-ENcOURAGEMENT OF DIVORCE-DABOLL v.
MOON, 91 Am. (CONN.) 646.-Held, the condition of a legacy to testator's
son to be paid to him on the death of his present wife, or if he should
obtain a divorce from her, or should become separated from her, or if
within a year after divorce or separation he should marry a good
respectable woman, is not contrary to public policy.
A condition attached to a legacy in restraint of marriage generally is
invalid as against public policy. In re Alexander's Estate, 85 Pac. 3o8,
149 Cal. 146; Contra, Harlow v. Bailey, 189 Mass. 2o8. This rule, how-
ever, does not extend to second marriages. Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn. 662,
37 L. R. A. 731; Dumey v. Schoeffler, 24 Mo. 17o. But the principal case
is not one where the condition is in restraint of marriage but rather tends
to promote a separation or divorce. This kind of condition has also been
held void as against public policy and the court in the principal case
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admits that "perhaps the weight of authority supports this view." Crger
v. Phelps, 47 N. Y. Supp. 61; In re Haight's Will, 64 N. Y. Supp. I129.
On the other hand the intention on the testator's part to bring about a
divorce will not be presumed. Coe v. Hill, 20 Mass. 15; Wiun v. Hall,
i Ky. Law Rep. 337. Hence a provision of a will by which a bequest
in trust was to become absolute on the termination of the beneficiary's'
marriage relations was held not to be void where the testator's purpose
was shown to be to protect his daughter (the beneficiary) from possible
depredations of her husband and not to incite her to a separation. Snor-
grass v. Thomas, 166 Mo. App. 603. When the wife is already living sep-
arate from her husband at the time the will is made, a bequest in it
giving property to the wife provided she remains separated from her
husband was held void as against public policy and the legatee took the
property freed from the condition. Witherspoon v. Brokaw, 85 Mo.
App. i69. Where, however, the wife is not absolutely deprived of the
property upon resuming marital relations, but retains all the beneficial
interest therein as cestui qui trust and at her death the principal goes
to her children, the condition has been held valid. Wright v. Mayer, 62
N. Y. Supp. 61o. The doctrine of the principal case is supported by
Ransdell v. Boston, 172 Ill. 439, 43 L. R. A. 526.
WITNESS-PRIv EGE-SELF-NCRIMINATION.-CoMMONWEALTH V. SOUTH-
ERN EXPREss Co., 169 S. W. (Ky.) 517.-Held, the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination does not extend to corporations and the privi-
lege may not be claimed for the corporation by its officers and agents.
The privilege above referred to contained in the fifth amendment to the
Federal constitution is personal, and is based upon the consideration of
the law for the individual in his capacity as a witness. Brown v. Walker,
161 U. S. 59i; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush. 594; Hale v. Henkle, 2o
U. S. 43. Therefore this privilege is not available to a witness on the
ground that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony,
even though he may be the agent of such person. Hale v. Henkle, supra.
A corporation is a "citizen" within the fourteenth amendment providing
that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the law.
Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pac. R. R., 118 U. S. 394. A corporation is not a
"citizen" within the meaning of Art. 4, sec. 2 of the Federal constitution
which entitles the citizens of each state to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the several states. Paid v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168; Pem-
bina Minig Co. v. Pennsylvaia, 125 U. S. 181. It will be observed that
while there is no question but that a corporation is a "person" there is
a difference of interpretation as to when a corporation is a "citizen,"
within the meaning of the constitution. Here it is not the corporation but
the agent who is on the stand testifying. In interpreting the Federal
constitution and in applying it to corporations, courts have kept in mind
the fact that corporations are creations of the state. As Mr. Justice
Hughes says: "It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having
chartered a corporation, to make use of certain franchises, could not in
the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how the franchise had been
employed and demand the corporate books and papers for that purpose.
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 384.
